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The F.T.C. Does Lord Mansfield In
By Ralph J. Rohner
A FTER YEARS of writhing agony atthe hands of courts and legislatures,
one of the most venerable of legal rules
has bitten the dust, and it happened right
here in Washington, D.C. The victim is
the holder in due course rule as it applies
to consumer credit transactions. The
slayer is neither the Supreme Court nor
the Congress but the oft-maligned Fed-
eral Trade Commission.
The seismic event occurred just before
Thanksgiving of 1975 when the commis-
sion issued its final version of a trade reg-
ulation rule entitled "Preservation of
Consumers' Claims and Defenses." The
rule was officially promulgated on
November 14, 1975, and may be found
beginning on page 53505 of the Federal
Register for November 18. Its effective
date will be May 14, 1976.
Holder in Due Course Abolished
What the rule does, in a nutshell, is
declare it to be an "unfair or deceptive act
or practice" under the Federal Trade
Commission Act for any retail seller to
take any consumer obligation which pur-
ports to cut off the consumer's defenses
against the seller when that obligation is
transferred on to a third-party financer.
For anyone whose memory can't recall
exactly the holder in due course idea
from law school, don't worry: this new
rule neatly wipes it out in all consumer
transactions.
If the retailer in the past might have
taken a negotiable promissory note or a
contract with a waiver-of-defense clause,
or might have accepted the proceeds of a
loan he helped the consumer get just to
make that purchase, now the credit ag-
reement in any of these situations must
include in bold print, ten-point type the
following notice:
ANY HOLDER OF THIS CONSUMER
CREDIT CONTRACT IS SUBJECT TO ALL
CLAIMS AND DEFENSES WHICH THE
DEBTOR COULD ASSERT AGAINST THE
SELLER OF GOODS OR SERVICES OB-
TAINED PURSUANT HERETO OR WITH
THE PROCEEDS HEREOF. RECOVERY
HEREUNDER BY THE DEBTOR SHALL
NOT EXCEED AMOUNTS PAID BY THE
DEBTOR HEREUNDER.
What this rule means is that consumer
debtors will never again find themselves
in the situation in which they must con-
tinue to pay for goods or services that
were not delivered or were defective, or
in which the consumer was defrauded, or
in which the seller went out of business,
taking the warranty protection with him.
Now consumers will be able to exercise
the one strong bit of leverage a credit
purchase gives them-the right to stop or
withhold payment. In a brief two-section
piece of administrative rule making, the
F.T.C. has accomplished what consumer
advocates have been unable to achieve so
completely in the courts and in the legisla-
tures over a span of decades.
Thus far-at least in this city-the
reaction has been much like that which
followed Lincoln's Gettysburg address:
a silence, both stunned and awed.
Elsewhere, one newspaper columnist has
declared that "consumers have finally hit
the jackpot" and has called May 14, 1976,
"the effective date of the consumers'
declaration of independence from that in-
famous, outrageous, and oppressive rule
of law." While most creditors apparently
are taking a resigned view that the aboli-
tion of holder in due course was inevita-
ble, one Midwest banker has written the
F.T.C. in outrage, indicating he will
promptly withdraw his bank from all con-
sumer financing and consumer lending
unless the commission reverses its ruling.
Precedent for Financer Protection
In order to appreciate the significance
of this new rule, one needs to understand
its background. The holder in due course
concept was first articulated in opinions
by Lord Mansfield for the King's Bench
in the mid-eighteenth century. What it
said, in its simplest formulation, was that
the good-faith purchaser for value of an
instrument held it free from the most
common defenses the maker might have
against the original creditor. Transposed
to the consumer marketplace in this coun-
try in the years following World War II,
the doctrine has permitted banks and fi-
nance companies to invest in consumer
obligations, or buy them outright, with
very little risk that those obligations
would be uncollectible because of mal-
performance by the seller. Holder in due
course, the credit industry argued, was an
essential enabling element in the wide-
spread availability of the credit consum-
ers wanted to be able to enjoy the good
life.
The doctrine had its harsh effects when
consumers had to pay for defective or
undelivered goods or services, and the
legal gimmickry that protected the finan-
cers was almost always included in the
boilerplate terms of the contract-rarely
read and rarely understood by the con-
sumer. Assaults on the doctrine were fre-
quent, persistent, and often vitriolic.
When the original 1969 version of the U-
niform Consumer Credit Code took an
equivocal position on holder in due
course, consumer spokesmen unloaded
on it. The F.T.C. itself that same year
began finding in individual cases that the
use of cut-off devices was an unfair or
deceptive practice.
Thus it was not altogether surprising in
1971 when the commission first proposed
a trade regulation rule on the subject.
The proceeding dragged on, with huge
amounts of testimony and materials being
accumulated, but with no consensus as to
what the rule should include. The pro-
ceeding was reopened with a revised
proposal in early 1973, and more hearings
were held in Washington and other cities.
For two years the entire matter lay dor-
mant. In late 1974 Congress enacted a
limited measure dealing with holder in
due course problems in credit card trans-
actions, but still there was no indication
of imminent final action from the com-
mission on its much more comprehensive
rule.
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In the meantime many states had taken
the initiative to deal with holder in due
course in legislation. More than forty
states have statutes curtailing the doc-
trine to some extent. A new 1974 version
of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code
took a much harder line against holder in
due course protections, including the so-
called related lender pattern of dealing.
(I have reviewed the entire history in
some detail in an article, "Holder in Due
Course in Consumer Transactions," in
the April, 1975, issue of the Cornell Law
Review.)
Objections to the Rule
By midsummer 1975 rumors spread
that the commission and its staff had not
given up on the rule but, in fact, were
polishing it up for final issuance. No one
could claim surprise when it did appear.
And now, months later, reflective reac-
tions and assessments are just beginning
to surface.
The commission accompanied the final
rule with a 150-page statement of basis
and purpose, which is well worth reading
for those who want to explore the com-
mission's own reasoning. Amply docu-
mented with citations to its own four-
and-a-half year record, the statement lays
out the commission's findings with re-
spect to the uses of negotiable notes,
waiver-of-defense clauses, and sale-
related loans. Objections to the rule are
analyzed and critiqued, and the commis-
sion's own purposes and justifications are
explained.
According to the commission:
"Our primary concern, in the course of
these proceedings, has been the distribu-
tion or allocation of costs occasioned by
seller misconduct in credit sale transac-
tions. These costs arise from breaches of
contract, breaches of warranty, misrep-
resentation, and even fraud. The current
commercial system, which enables sell-
ers and creditors to divorce a consumer's
obligation to pay for goods and services
from the seller's obligation to perform as
promised, allocates all of these costs to
the consumer/buyer. Consumers are gen-
erally not in a position to evaluate the
likelihood of seller misconduct in a par-
ticular transaction. Misconduct costs are
not incorporated in the price of the goods
or services, nor are they reflected in any
deferred payment price or unpaid balance
of a sales-related loan. Seller misconduct
costs are thus externalized in a way that
renders many sales finance transactions
inherently deceptive and misleading. In
addition, to the extent that consumers are
also compelled to bear the costs oc-
casioned by the misconduct of another,
while the 'guilty' party avoids all liability,
we believe that reliance on contractual
foreclosures of equities in consumer
transactions constitutes an unfair prac-
tice under Section Five of the F.T.C.
Act."
To this, I say "Amen." There are so
many bogeymen invoked in debates over
consumer credit regulation-the most
common is that restrictions on uncon-
scionable creditor practices will dry up
sources of credit or price it beyond the
reach of most consumers-that it is to the
credit of the commission and its staff
that they took the time to separate the
wheat from the chaff and produce a rule
both simple and comprehensive. The ar-
gument that creditors need holder in due
course protection to keep costs down and
to make credit available was deflated by
the commission, which noted also that it
might be distinctly good to dry up the
sources of credit for the food-freezer
rackets, the home improvement
swindlers, and the vanishing health spa
operators.
The best quoted remark in the record to
me is this, by Prof. Homer Kripke of the
New York University Law School, him-
self a longtime finance company lawyer:
"The banks ought to be ashamed of argu-
ing that they are serving merchants whose
injuries to their customers are so substan-
tial as to constitute a significant impair-
ment of the collectibility of the obliga-
tions."
Recoveries Allowed
The critical paragraph that must appear
on every credit obligation is deceptively
simple, but there are some careful and
judicious decisions underlying it. For
example, the commission avoided the
mistake of the original U.C.C.C. of limit-
ing the consumer to a defense or set-off
against a claim by the creditor, thus ap-
parently denying the consumer a right to
seek reformation or rescission. The rule
expressly allows affirmative recoveries
up to the amount paid to the creditor. The
commission also declined to have the dis-
closure statement spell out any time limits
for asserting rights and refused to put into
the definition of purchase money loan a
laundry list of presumptive connections
between a seller and a lender. The first of
these would necessarily have been arbi-
trary, to some consumers' disadvantage,
and the second would tend to hamstring
enforcement efforts with endless factual
disputes about the extent and nature of
the relationship.
Somewhat surprisingly the rule does
not touch credit card transactions. The
commission says that is because they
simply found no evidence of a problem
with credit cards, but this is hard to re-
concile with the F.T.C. Act's express di-
rective to prevent future abuses. More
likely the commission was shying away
from any possible conflict with the Fair
Credit Billing Act, which does put some
limits on holder in due course in credit
card plans.
At the same time there are some gaps,
loopholes, and other potential stumbling
blocks to the full implementation of the
rule, and they should be noted.
The rule may be challenged in court by
creditor interests on the allegation that it
exceeds the commission's authority. Al-
though doomed to fail, this tactic could
delay the rule's full effectiveness. And a
reactionary Congress conceivably could
overturn it by statute, but this is even
more unlikely.
Some litigation will be needed to flesh
out the meaning of parts of the rule, such
as the definition of a "purchase money
loan." When, for example, does a seller
"refer customers to the creditor"? When
exactly are a seller and a creditor "af-
filiated . . . by common control, contract
or business arrangement"?
By its terms the rule proscribes only
conduct by "sellers." This means that a
fly-by-night operator who may be willing
to risk F.T.C. prosecution might gener-
ate quantities of consumer paper without
the required legend and discount it to un-
suspecting financers. Since violations of
the F.T.C. Act do not constitute per se
actionable private wrongs, those cred-
itors might invoke holder-in-due-course
swords against those consumers. In any
case in which a third-party creditor is a
knowing collaborator in violations of the
rule, he is for the moment beyond reach of
the enforcement authorities. The com-
mission, however, simultaneously with
the issuance of this rule, has issued a
proposed revision of the rule to extend its
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scope to creditors as well as sellers.
Comments on this proposal and proposed
issues of fact were due by January 15,
1976, and we may only hope that this logi-
cal extension of the rule is not deferred
another four and a half years.
Since the F.T.C.'s jurisdiction does
not include banks, there is a potential
loophole for credit transactions other
than sales. Lenders conceivably could
still do a brisk business in notes that are
discounted to old-fashioned holders in
due course. Although apparently not re-
quired to do so by the recent Federal
Trade Commission Improvements Act,
which calls for parallel regulations, the
Federal Reserve Board probably will
issue soon a companion regulation bind-
ing on banks. This will not only close
down this loophole but bring the en-
forcement authority of the bank regula-
tory agencies to bear on creditors who
might be inclined to skirt the F.T.C. rule.
The most frustrating aspect of the rule
is that its enforcement is left almost com-
pletely in the hands of the commission
itself. This, of course, is the nature of
trade regulation rules. Even with the ex-
panded powers given it in the Federal
Trade Commission Improvements Act
(Public Law 93-637), the commission is
still notoriously short of the resources
needed to be a vigilant policeman of its
own rules throughout the country. Al-
though the commission's jurisdiction now
runs to activities both "in" and "affect-
ing" commerce and it now has statutory
authority to seek restitution for injured
consumers, the public will have to keep
its fingers crossed that the commission
can adequately detect, investigate, and
move against serious violators. What
could and ought to happen is that the state
legislatures or Congress will see the ad-
vantage of and need to convert the rule to
statutes enforceable by the affected indi-
viduals themselves.
And so, without great fanfare, the bur-
den of holder in due course has been lifted
from the American consuming public. Or
soon will be. And the "good guys' in the
piece are the folks at the tip of the Federal
Triangle in Washington. A
Section Membership
Dues Raised
AT THE 1975 annual meeting in
Montr~al, the House of Delegates
approved the recommendation of the Sec-
tion of Insurance, Negligence, and Com-
pensation Law to increase its member-
ship dues from $12.00 to $17.50 a year.
The dues increase will apply to the As-
sociation year 1976-77 and will be re-
flected in the first billing for that year.
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1976 ROSS ESSAY CONTEST
The following information is furnished for contestants in the 1976 Ross
Essay Contest, which is conducted by the American Bar Association pur-
suant to the terms of the bequest of Judge Erskine M. Ross.
Time for Submission: On or before April 1, 1976
Amount of Prize: $5,000
Subject: "Should the Code of Professional Responsibility be amended to
make better known to the public the availability of legal services?"
Eligibility: The contest will be open to all members of the Association in
good standing, including new members elected prior to March 1, 1976
(except previous winners, members of the Board of Governors, officers and
employees of the Association), who have paid their annual dues to the
Association for the fiscal year in which the essay is to be submitted.
Essay Requirements: No essay will be accepted unless prepared for this
contest and not previously published. Each entrant will be required to
assign to the Association all right, title, and interest in the essay submitted.
It is the policy of the Association to return all but the winning manuscript
after the judges have madetheir decision and to release the assignment of
rights.
Instructions: All necessary instructions and complete information with
respect to the number of words, number of copies, footnotes, citations, and
means of identification may be secured on request to the Ross Essay
Contest, American Bar Association, 1155 East Sixtieth Street, Chicago,
Illinois 60637.
Notice by the Secretary of the
American Bar Association
Regarding Election of Assembly Delegates
* Five Assembly delegates to the House of Delegates will be elected at the 1976
annual meeting for three-year terms beginning with the adjournment of the meeting
and ending with the adjournment of the 1979 annual meeting. Candidates for elec-
tion as Assembly delegates are to be nominated by written petition. For the 1976
election in Atlanta, Georgia, the deadline for filing nominating petitions is May 28,
1976.
If more than one resident of the same district submits nominating petitions, each
will be notified within ten days of the fact that there is more than one nominee from
that district. Under the constitution, no more than one nominee from a particular
district may be elected in the annual election. Districts are defined in Section 2.1 of
the constitution.
Voting, by I.B.M. ballot, will be in the registration area of the headquarters hotel.
The polls will be open during the same hours as the registration area, except on the
last day the polls will close at 11:00A.M. The votes will be tallied and the five nominees
with the highest number of votes (taking into account that no more than one may be
elected from the same district) will be declared elected as Assembly delegates. In the
event of a tie vote, the secretary will determine the winner by lot. Rules which restrict
campaigning for the position of Assembly delegate will be mailed to all nominees
upon receipt of their petitions.
Nominating petition forms may be obtained from the office of the Secretary,
American Bar Center, 1155 East Sixtieth Street, Chicago, Illinois 60637. The petition
must be signed by twenty-five members of the American Bar Association. The
signing by any member of one petition will not disqualify him as the signer of other
petitions. Each petition must be filed with the secretary at the above address before
the close of business at 4:45 P.M., Chicago time, May 28, 1976, together with the
written consent of the nominee and the biographical sketch of the nominee in the
form approved by the nominee and consisting of not more than fifty words. All
biographical sketches will be printed and distributed to Association members asthey
register or collect their credentials at the registration desk at the annual meeting.
Any questions regarding the foregoing should be sent promptly to the Office of the
Secretary at the American Bar Center.
Herbert D. Sledd, Secretary
